How did we get here? 

How did free trade become a bad word, old friends become economic enemies, and tariffs become a point of debate from the halls of Congress to factory floors around the world?  

There is one man who knows the answer to that better than anyone. And he’s not necessarily the one sitting in the Oval Office. His name is Robert Lighthizer, and his experience with economic policymaking goes back to the 1970s when he was hired by Bob Dole to be the Republican staff director of the Senate Finance Committee. More recently, in 2016, he was appointed Trade Representative during Donald Trump’s first presidential term. Today, though he is not a part of the current administration, his economic policy ideas are central to it: Lighthizer is widely accepted to be the stimulus behind Trump’s current tariff strategy that has shocked, dismayed and (in some corners at least) delighted people across the political spectrum. 

Just this May, Lighthizer joined a cohort of Norwegian and international profiles from business, finance, energy and politics to discuss (and debate) energy, competitiveness and climate at the annual Statkraft Conference in Oslo. 

 

In an exclusive interview on stage at the conference, he shared answers to urgent questions being asked about the tariffs. We’ve gathered four of the most insightful comments from his interview below. 

1. U.S. Trade policy shift from free trade to economic nationalism

During his interview, Lighthizer, reflecting Trump’s stance, described free trade as a failed experiment for the U.S.”, arguing that it has contributed, among other factors, to a massive annual trade deficit (over $1 trillion) and a negative net international investment position of -$26.5 trillion. This shift implies a long-term, structural move away from multilateralism toward bilateralism and unilateralism, with tariffs described by Lighthizer as “flexibile and easy to understand” instruments to rebalance trade. 

2. Industrial policy and tariffs as economic weapons 

The Lighthizer doctrine favours universal tariffs to curb imports and directly influence internal consumption and production. This scenario, Lighthizer explained, sees countries with persistent trade surpluses—especially those with aggressive industrial policies—are targets. This suggests that export-driven economies with strong industrial policies such as China (Lighthizer also mentioned Germany) are in the crosshairs of future tariff regimes unless trade is seen as "balanced" from the U.S. point of view. Norway, he suggested, would be impacted to a lesser extent, being exposed to less punitive tariffs. 

3. Rise of economic sovereignty over multilateralism 

Lighthizer was critical of the WTO’s effectiveness, advocating unilateral action as a faster and more impactful instrument. This represents a clear turn away from rule-based trade systems, implying that future U.S. administrations could possibly prioritise short-term national advantage over global consensus. 

4. A new, transactional world order 

Lastly, when asked whether this is the start of a new world order and whether in the next decade trade policy will look fundamentally different from the previous three decades, Lighthizer said that he expects no Republican nor Democratic president in this generation or the next to advocate for free trade. That signals a fundamental transformation of U.S. economic engagement with the world, one that is likely to outlast the Trump administration and potentially reshape global trade dynamics for the coming decades. In that scenario European leaders would need to be prepared for a more unpredictable and geopolitically-charged trade environment. 

If you would like to watch more recordings from the Statkraft Conference 2025, including an interview with Ukraine’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, you can access them on this dedicated page.